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Abstract—Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is envisioned
to be one of the most challenging security problems in the coming
decade. One key challenge in CIP is the ability to allocate resources,
either personnel or cyber, to critical infrastructures with different
vulnerability and criticality levels. In this work, a contract-theoretic
approach is proposed to solve the problem of resource allocation
in critical infrastructure with asymmetric information. A control
center (CC) is used to design contracts and offer them to infrastruc-
tures’ owners. A contract can be seen as an agreement between the
CC and infrastructures using which the CC allocates resources and
gets rewards in return. Contracts are designed in a way to maximize
the CC’s benefit and motivate each infrastructure to accept a con-
tract and obtain proper resources for its protection. Infrastructures
are defined by both vulnerability levels and criticality levels which
are unknown to the CC. Therefore, each infrastructure can claim
that it is the most vulnerable or critical to gain more resources.
A novel mechanism is developed to handle such an asymmetric
information while providing the optimal contract that motivates
each infrastructure to reveal its actual type. The necessary and
sufficient conditions for such resource allocation contracts under
asymmetric information are derived. Simulation results show that
the proposed contract-theoretic approach maximizes the CC’s utility
while ensuring that no infrastructure has an incentive to ask for
another contract, despite the lack of exact information at the CC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure (CI) is a term used to describe cyber and
networking systems that are considered essential to the function-
ing of our modern economies and societies. CIs can cut across a
variety of domains and applications. For instance, in the United
States, the Department of Homeland Security classifies CIs into
sixteen sectors that include energy production, financial services,
communications, nuclear reactors, transportation systems, water
supply, and financial services [1]. However, in general there is
no global classification for CIs and each country determines its
own critical categories independently.
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) has recently attracted
significant attention [2]–[5], particularly following recent terrorist
and malicious attacks that targeted CIs across various countries.
One main challenge in CIP is the fact that governmental agencies
have only a limited amount of resources, such as personnel or
even cyber resources, that can be used for CIP. Under such
resource constraints and given the complex nature of CIs, it is im-
perative to develop practical resource management mechanisms
that can optimally allocate such resources, given the criticality
levels and vulnerabilities of the various CIs. Such resource de-
ployment strategies are particularly critical for protecting CIs that
are based in foreign countries or remote sites. In such scenarios,
government agencies who want to protect local and foreign CIs
will often own a control center (CC) that is responsible for
monitoring these CIs and distributing resources among them.
One major challenge for resource deployment here, is the fact
that the CIs are often owned by different entities that consider
their own CIs to be the most critical. Indeed, every CI owner will
report to the CC that its own infrastructure is the most vulnerable
and most critical. Determining real levels of vulnerability and
criticality of each individual infrastructure is very challenging
for the CC. However, intuitively, the CC should design a proper
mechanism to allocate resources based on the vulnerability and
criticality levels of each CI. For example, highly vulnerable CIs
should get higher resources than less vulnerable ones. Similarly,
highly critical CIs must be properly prioritized in the CIP process.
However, as each CI will attempt to get as much resources as
possible by claiming that it is the most vulnerable or critical, the
CC may not be able to properly distribute its limited resources.
The problem of CIP has attracted recent attention in the
literature such as in [2]–[5]. The work in [2] focused on CI
control systems by presenting a system to secure their functions
and management tasks. Similarly, the authors in [3] dealt with
CI control systems by exposing and analyzing the vulnerabilities
of these systems. In [4], the authors proposed a risk-aware
robotic sensor network and applied it to CIP. The work in [5]
studied the vulnerabilities and protection challenges that face CIs
and proposed a collaborative game theoretic solution for CIP.
Although these works proposed solutions to CIP problem, they
did not address resource allocation problem, as studied here.
The problem of resource allocation for CIP has been studied
in recent works such as [6] and [7]. The work in [6] studied
an optimal resource allocation scenario in which resources were
allocated to CIs depending on the likelihood of these CIs to be
attacked according to their valuation on possible attackers. The
authors in [7] studied the problem of allocating resources where
resources were supposed to protect an area and the objective was
to maximize the area protected by these resources. Despite their
importance, these existing works did not address the problem
of asymmetric information in resource allocation which was first
studied in [8]. The problem discussed in [8] cannot be generalized
to a large-scale CIP system as it addresses an isolated problem
and it does not take into account the impact of information
availability on resource allocation.
In contrast to these works, here, we propose a contract-
theoretic model to allocate resources for CIP under asymmetric
information. Contract theory is a powerful framework from
microeconomics that provides a useful set of tools for modeling
mechanisms under information asymmetry [9]. The key idea is
that the CC should offer right contracts to CIs so that they have
the incentive to truthfully reveal their information. In our model,
the CC is seen as the principal that offers contracts to agents
which are the CIs. While contract theory has been studied in
the context of wireless networks [10], [11], such works do not
apply directly to CIP and their results cannot be generalized for
accounting for criticality and vulnerability levels of the CIs.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a resource al-
location mechanism for CIP that can optimally allocate resources
between a number of CIs without knowing their exact types. The
problem is formulated using a contract-theoretic model in which
the CC calculates the amount of resources that will be given
to each CI and offer contracts to CIs with these values and the
rewards they should reciprocate. In particular, we proposed a
novel approach to define a CI by accounting for two different
CI types according to the vulnerability and criticality levels.
Both types are used in the process of resource allocation and
the criticality level is also used to prioritize CIs that will be
protected. For the formulated problem, we analyzed the necessary
and sufficient conditions for deriving the optimal contracts. We
studied the optimal contract and we proved that the problem has
an optimal solution for the case of two CIs. The model was also
shown to motivate each CI to reveal its actual type and accept
the contract designed for its type, therefore allowing resource
allocation in the absence of exact information at the CC on the
criticality and vulnerability levels of the CIs. Simulation results
show that the proposed approach will yield a higher CC utility
when compared with a baseline resource allocation algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides the system model and defines the vulnerability and
criticality levels of the CIs. In Section III, the problem is formu-
lated as a contract-theoretic mechanism and several properties
are derived and analyzed. Simulation results are discussed in
Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system in which one control center (CC),
that can represent a government agency is interested in sending
missions to secure N CIs in a set N that can be owned by
different entities (e.g., foreign agencies, different department of
defense agencies, etc.). The missions are viewed as resources
owned by the CC and that must be allotted to different CIs.
Such resources can be personnel or cyber resources. Each CI
has some vulnerable points that need to be protected. As the
number of vulnerable points of a CI increases, the amount of
resources needed to protect it will also increase. Infrastructures
are classified into groups according to their vulnerability levels.
The vulnerability level can be represented by an integer number
wi where there areM different levels in the setM and M ≤ N ;
thus yielding different M vulnerability levels. Infrastructures are
grouped by an increasing order of vulnerability levels:
w1 < . . . < wi < . . . < wM . (1)
A higher w implies that the CI has a higher vulnerability level.
The CC does not have exact information on the individual wi of
every CI i. Instead, the CC can know with which probability a
certain CI can belong to a certain w type . Therefore, we let pi,wj
be the probability with which CI i belongs to a certain type wj .
Each CI has also a criticality level that can be represented by
a number θi where there are different K levels in the set K and
K ≤ N . Thus there exists K criticality levels to which various
CIs can belong. The criticality level is determined by factors such
as the service performed by this CI and its relation to other CIs.
The CIs are grouped by an increasing order of criticality levels:
θ1 < . . . < θi < . . . < θK . (2)
A higher θ implies that the CI has a higher criticality level
and thus it is more critical for the CC to protect it. Similar to the
vulnerability levels here, we assume that the CC does not have
exact information on the individual θi of CI i. Instead, the CC
can only know with which probability a certain CI can belong to
θ type . Therefore, we let qi,θj be the probability with which CI
i belongs to a certain type θj . The criticality level is used mainly
to help the CC decide which CIs will be protected in case not
enough resources are available for all CIs.
The values of w and θ are selected in a way that makes the
resource allocation depends primarily on the vulnerability level.
The criticality level affects the resource allocation but without
superseding the vulnerability level, i.e., the criticality level will
help the CI to get more resources than a less critical infrastructure
but not more than a highly vulnerable one. Therefore, the
values of θ when combined with w; should satisfy the following
property:
θK · wi ≤ θ1 · wi+1, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M − 1. (3)
In this case, θ can be seen as a sub-type under w type in the
process of allocation, although they are really independent.
To address the resource allocation problem, we explore the
analogy between allocating resources to CIs and forming con-
tractual agreements between firms and employees. We propose
to use contract theory – a powerful framework from microeco-
nomics [9], [12], that allows to analyze the process of creating
contracts between firms and employees. Here, we note that,
although some recent works [10], [11] have looked at contract
theory for wireless communication; however, these works do not
handle the challenges of CI resource allocation.
We cast the CIP problem as a contractual situation with
asymmetric hidden information between a firm, here being the
CC, and a number of employees, here being the N CIs (or
their owners). The asymmetric hidden information property stems
from the fact that the CC does not know the exact vulnerability
and criticality levels of every CI. To overcome this information
asymmetry, the CC must properly specify a contract defined as a
pair (T,R(T )) where T is the amount of resources allocated to
the CI, which can be viewed as the reward/payment made by the
firm to the employee and R is the reward that the CC reaps when
protecting this CI. We will assume in this model that the reward
is an increasing linear function in resources T that takes the form
Ri(T ) = riT where ri is determined by the vulnerability type
wi such that ri is higher with higher w’s. This implies that, for
a higher vulnerability level, the CI is required to pay a higher
reward than a less vulnerable one, if they take the same amount of
resources. Actually, this reward function design is very important
in order for the contract to be binding. By using this design, the
CI that claims that has a higher vulnerability level to get more
resources than it needs, will be required to pay a higher reward
for the needed resources. The signing of a contract between the
CC and a certain CI is thus an agreement by the CC to send
certain resources to protect the CI which in return will pay a
reward R to the CC.
In this system, instead of offering the same contract to all
of the CIs and wasting resources, the CC will attempt to offer
different contract bundles that are designed in accordance with
different types of w and θ for the available CIs. For the CC, when
it decides to protect a certain CI of type i, its utility function can
simply be defined as the difference between reward and resources
allocated multiplied by the CI type, i.e.,
UCC,i(Ti) = θiwi(Ri(Ti)− Ti). (4)
Since there are M types of CIs according to type w with
probability pi,wj and K types according to θ with probability
qi,θj , the total utility of the CC can be given by:
UCC(T ) =
∑
i∈N
(∑
k∈K
qi,θk · θk
)( ∑
j∈M
pi,wj ·wj · (Rj(Ti)−Ti)
)
.
(5)
From the CI side, the utility function of a certain CI i ∈ N :
Ui(Ti) = θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti), (6)
where β is a positive unit cost parameter that is less than 1
and V (Ti) is the evaluation function regarding the rewards (how
much does this CI value the resources allocated) which is a
strictly increasing function of T that takes the form V (Ti) = vTi
where v is the numerical value for the evaluation function. Here,
we assume that, to reward the CC, the CI has to pay some cost,
such as a negotiation or implementation cost. The contract offered
by the CC needs to be feasible for the CI, i.e., it needs to be
persuading for the CI to accept. To this end, next, we discuss the
conditions for the feasibility of a contract in the studied model.
A. Feasibility of a Contract
To ensure that both CC and CI owners have an incentive to
work together for CIP, the contracts represented by the pairs
(Ti, Ri(Ti)) must satisfy two key properties:
1) Individual Rationality (IR): The contract that an infras-
tructure selects should guarantee that the utility of this
infrastructure is nonnegative, i.e.,
Ui = θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ 0, i ∈ N . (7)
2) Incentive Compatibility (IC): Each infrastructure must al-
ways prefer the contract designed for its type, over all other
contracts, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ N , i 6= j:
θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ θiwiV (Tj)− βRj(Tj). (8)
The IR constraint ensures that, when a CI signs a certain
contract, the received reward must compensate the effort that
the CI owner has exerted for the CC. The IC constraint allows
to overcome the information asymmetry as it allows to satisfy
the revelation principle [9]: A certain CI of type i will always
prefer the contract (Ti, Ri(Ti)) that the CC designed for its type
over all other possible contracts. In other words, a CI i receives
the maximum utility when selecting the contract designed for its
own type and, thus, this CI will have an incentive to reveal its
true vulnerability and criticality levels. A contract is therefore
said to be feasible if both IR and IC are satisfied. We can state
the following lemma from the previous conditions:
Lemma 1. For any feasible contract (T,R); Ti > Tj if and only
if wi > wj .
Proof. We prove this lemma by using the IC constraint. we have:
θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) > θiwiV (Tj)− βRj(Tj),
θjwjV (Tj)− βRj(Tj) > θjwjV (Ti)− βRi(Ti).
By adding the two inequalities, we get:
θiwiV (Ti) + θjwjV (Tj) > θiwiV (Tj) + θjwjV (Ti),
θiV (Ti)− θjwjV (Ti) > θiwiV (Tj)− θjwjV (Tj),
V (Ti)(θiwi − θjwj) > V (Tj)(θiwi − θjwj).
Since wi > wj and this implies that θiwi > θjwj , we
obtain V (Ti) > V (Tj). By definition, we know that V (T ) is
an increasing function of T , and therefore, since V (Ti) > V (Tj)
we have Ti > Tj .
Lemma 1 simply proves that the CC must provide more
resources to the CI with higher number of vulnerability points,
i.e., the one that belongs to a higher w type. This essentially
corroborates mathematically our intuition that more resources
must be dedicated to more vulnerable CI. Using this lemma, we
can state the following monotonicity property:
Ti ≤ Tj if wi < wj , ∀i, j ∈ N . (9)
Another lemma that can be derived from the IR and IC
constraints pertains to the utility of the CI:
Lemma 2. For any feasible contract (T,R(T )), the utility of
each infrastructure must satisfy:
Ui(Ti) ≥ Uj(Tj) if wi > wj , ∀i, j ∈ N . (10)
Proof. This result can be shown as follows. We know that an
infrastructure which asks for more resources should provide
larger rewards to the CC, i.e., if wi > wj then Ti > Tj and
also Ri > Rj . Then, if wi > wj , we have:
Ui(Ti) = θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) > θiwiV (Tj)− βRj(Tj)
> θjwjV (Tj)−Rj(Tj) = Uj(Tj).
Thus, a CI with a higher vulnerability level will receive more
utility than one with a lower vulnerability level. From the IC
constraint and the two shown lemmas, we can easily deduce the
following. If a higher type CI selects a contract designed for a
lower type, the less received resources will jeopardize this CI’s
utility. Moreover, if a lower type CI selects a contract intended
for a higher type, the gain in terms of resources acquired cannot
compensate the cost that this CI must reciprocate to the CC. A
CI can thus receive its maximum utility if and only if it selects
the contract that can best fit its type.
Finally two more constraints must be imposed. First, the CC
should take into account that the summation of all allocated
resources should be equal to the maximum resources available at
the control center:
∑
i∈N
Ti = Tmax.
Second, that every CI should get sufficient amount of resources
to overcome its vulnerable points. That means every type wi
should be associated with a minimum amount of resources.
Therefore, each CI will have a minimum required resources
according to its w type. This can be expressed as: Ti ≥ Ti,min.
III. OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
In this section, we first investigate how the CC can actually find
its optimal contracts. In essence, given the hidden information,
the only information available at the CC is pi,wj and qi,θj . The
goal of the CC is to design contracts that allow it to maximize the
use of its resources and, thus, to maximize its utility by solving
the following optimization problem:
max
T
∑
i∈N
(∑
k∈K
qi,θk ·θk
)( ∑
j∈M
pi,wj ·wj ·(Rj(Ti)−Ti)
)
, (11)
s.t. θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ 0, i ∈ N,
θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ θiwiV (Tj)− βRj(Tj), i 6= j,
Ti ≥ Ti,min,∑
i∈N
Ti = Tmax.
The problem contains a large number of constraints. For
instance, the IC constraints correspond to N(N − 1) equations.
To overcome this, next, we develop a way to relax the problem
and reduce the number of constraints to get a more simple
problem that could be solved. The problem can be relaxed using
a technique inspired from the work in [12].
A. Relaxed Problem
The incentive compatibility must to be relaxed because for
every one of the CIs we need to define N − 1 conditions.
Therefore, we will now study the local IC constraints, which are,
the downward local IC (DLIC) which corresponds to the relation
between CIs i and i− 1. The other local IC is the upward local
IC (ULIC) which corresponds to the relation between CIs i and
i+ 1. We can now prove the following:
Theorem 1. With the IR satisfied, the local incentive constraints
θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ θiwiV (Ti−1)− βRi−1(Ti−1), (12)
θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ θiwiV (Ti+1)− βRi+1(Ti+1). (13)
for all i ∈ N are sufficient for global incentive compatibility.
Proof. Note (12) is called DLIC(i) and (13) is called ULIC(i).
We begin by expressing DLIC(i) and DLIC(i− 1) as follows:
θiwiV (Ti)− θiwiV (Ti−1) ≥ β(Ri(Ti)−Ri−1(Ti−1)),
θi−1wi−1V (Ti−1)− θi−1wi−1V (Ti−2) ≥
β(Ri−1(Ti−1)−Ri−2(Ti−2)).
Then by adding DLIC(i) and DLIC(i− 1) we get:
θiwiV (Ti)− θiwiV (Ti−1) + θi−1wi−1V (Ti−1)
−θi−1wi−1V (Ti−2) ≥ β(Ri(Ti)−Ri−2(Ti−2)).
and as θi−1wi−1 ≤ θiwi we can replace it in the previous
equation to yield:
θiwiV (Ti)− θiwiV (Ti−2) ≥ β(Ri(Ti)−Ri−2(Ti−1)). (14)
However, (14) is the IC constraint for CIs i and i − 2 which
can be written as IC(i, i − 2). This means that DLIC(i) and
DLIC(i − 1) imply IC(i, i − 2). With the same principle we
can show that IC(i, i− 1) and DLIC(i− 2) imply IC(i, i− 3),
etc. Therefore, starting at i = N and proceeding inductively
downward until i = 2, DLIC(i) implies that IC(i, j) holds for
all i ≥ j. A similar argument in the reverse direction establishes
that ULIC(i) implies IC(i, j) for i ≤ j.
We can also reduce the IR constraints. There are a total ofN IR
constraints must be satisfied. Assume, without loss of generality,
that the CI 1 is from type w1. By using the IC constraints and
the IR constraint of the first CI, referred to by IR(1), we have:
θiwiV (Ti)− βRi(Ti) ≥ θiwiV (T1)− βR1(T1)
≥ θ1w1V (T1)−R1(T1) ≥ 0. (15)
Thus, if the first IR constraint of w type-1 user is satisfied, all
the other IR constraints will automatically hold. Therefore, we
only need to keep the first IR constraints and reduce the others.
After reducing the constraints, we have a new problem which is
the same as the problem in equation (11) but with the new relaxed
constraints in equations (12) and (15) instead of the complete IR
and IC constraints.
Note that design parameters such as the reward function R, θ,
w, and β should be adjusted by the CC to ensure that IR(1) is
satisfied.
B. Solution of the Relaxed Problem
To solve the relaxed problem, we first observe that there are
now only 2N inequality constraints and one equality constraint.
We can use Lagrangian analysis along with KKT conditions to
solve the problem. The Lagrangian of the problem is:
L(T, λ, µ) =
∑
i∈N
(∑
k∈K
qi,θkθk
)( ∑
j∈M
pi,wjwj(Rj(Ti)− Ti)
)
+
N∑
i=2
µi
(
θiwiV (Ti)− θiwiV (Ti−1)− βRi(Ti)
+ βRi−1(Ti−1)
)
+ µ1(θ1w1V (T1)− βR1(T1))
+
N∑
i=1
µN+i(Ti − Ti,min) + λ(Tmax −
N∑
i=1
Ti). (16)
We need to solve this Lagrangian with KKT conditions to find
all T values along with µ values and λ. The solution of this
problem is not straightforward as the complexity increases with
the number of CIs. Therefore, we will show the solution for only
two CIs, to show that the problem has a feasible solution. For
two CIs, the Lagrangian will be:
L(T, λ, µ) = p1,w1w1(r1T1 − T1) + p1,w2w2(r2T1 − T1)
+ p2,w1w1(r1T2 − T2) + p2,w2w2(r2T2 − T2)
+ µ2(θ2w2vT2 − θ2w2vT1 − βr2T2 + βr1T1)
+ µ1(θ1w1vT1 − βr1T1) + µ3(T1 − T1,min)
+ µ4(T2 − T2,min) + λ(Tmax − T1 − T2).
The KKT conditions for this Lagrangian are the relaxed
problem constraints along with:
p1,w1w1(r1 − 1) + p1,w2w2(r2 − 1) + µ1(θ1w1v − βr1)
+ µ2(βr1 − θ2w2v) + µ3 − λ = 0.
p2,w1w1(r1 − 1) + p2,w2w2(r2 − 1) + µ2(θ2w2v − βr2)
+ µ4 − λ = 0.
µ1(θ1w1vT1 − βr1T1) = 0.
µ2(θ2w2(vT2 − vT1)− β(r2T2 + r1T1) = 0.
µ3(T1 − T1,min = 0.
µ4(T2 − T2,min = 0.
µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 ≥ 0.
This problem gives only one optimal solution which is T1 =
T1,min and T2 = Tmax−T1. Actually this solution is only feasible
if the following condition is satisfied T1,min + T2,min ≤ Tmax.
This implies that low vulnerability type CI will take its minimum
required resources and the rest goes to the higher type CI. This
result is not surprising as it is aligned with contract-theoretic
results that study the contractual situation between a firm and
two agencies (of two different types). [9]. For the case of more
than two CIs, the lower type CI will get its lower limit and the
rest of resources will be allocated to higher types according to
their probabilities in a way to maximize the CC’s utility.
C. Practical Implementation
Beside designing contracts, the CC needs to communicate with
CIs, determine which CIs to protect, and sign contracts with
them. We give the actual steps taken by the CC in this regard
in Algorithm 1. The CC begins by having the initial information
such as the set of vulnerability levelsM, the probability pi,wj of
that a CI i will belong to each of theM levels, the set of criticality
levels K and the probability qi,θj of that a CI i will belong to
each of the K levels. The CC also knows the minimum amount
of resources required to protect a CI in each of the vulnerability
levels as well as the total amount of available resources. The CC,
hence, declares that it will offer resources to protect some CIs
and begins to receive requests from CIs that are willing to be
protected and designs optimal contracts for them.
Algorithm 1 shows the importance of the criticality level.
When the CC is not able to protect all the CIs, it will discard
some CIs depending on their criticality levels as the CC is
more interested in protecting higher critical CIs. This is done
by removing the least critical infrastructures from the process
of designing contracts. However, as the CC only knows the
probabilities of criticality levels, it will remove the one that
belongs to the lower criticality level with a higher probability. The
CC repeats this process until there is enough resources for the
rest of CIs. When CIs receive contracts, they will evaluate them
and inform the CC whether they are willing to accept a contract,
i.e., receive resources and return reward. If not all CIs accept a
contract, the CC will reconsider any CIs that were excluded due
to lack of resources. After this process is finished, the CC will
sign contracts with CIs and allocate resources.
Algorithm 1: Optimized Contract implementation of CC for
Resource Allocation
Input: M,K, pi,wj , qi,θj , Tmax, Ti,min
Output: (T,R(T ))
1. CC declares its willingness to protect some infrastructures
2. Receive request from infrastructures willing to be
protected
3.Solve the optimal contract for current infrastructures
if The program has a solution, i.e, the avaialble resources
are sufficient for all users then
Contracts are ready, proceed to step 4
else
Remove the least critical infrastructure (begin with
higher probability)
return to step 3
4. The CC Offers the contracts and waits for feedback
if All infrastructures accepted the offered contracts then
proceed to step 5
else
return to step 3, for any previously excluded
infrastructures
5. Sign contracts with infrastructures and allocate resources
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Fig. 1. The CC utility in the case of using the proposed contract and the case of
equal resource allocation when fixing Tmax and when increasing Tmax by 30%
with every added infrastructure.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Simulations are used to evaluate the designed mechanism. For
our simulations, we choose 3 vulnerability levels and 4 criticality
levels. The number of available resources is set to 500. The
reward function increases by 3 for each w type. The evaluation
function was assumed to be two times the resources. The lower
bounds associated with w types are set to 20, 60, and 100
respectively. First, we check the feasibility of our contract. We
assume that all CIs ask for protection and all of them accept
contracts offered by the CC. We calculate the CC’s utility in
case of using the proposed mechanism and in case of allocating
resources equally between CIs.
In Fig. 1, we show the variation in the CC utility as the number
of infrastructures increases; the utility is normalized to the case
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Fig. 2. Infrastructures’ utilities in the case of using the proposed contract and the
case of equal resource allocation.
of equal resource allocation. The figure studies two cases: fixing
the amount of resources for all CIs and increasing the amount of
resources each time a CI is added. When the number of resources
is fixed to 500, in Fig. 1, we can see that, with 3 CIs there is
about 75% increase in the CC utility, relative to equal allocation.
When more CIs are added, the percentage increase in CC utility
is between 10% and 20%. This is due to the fact that, when the
number of CIs is small, the CC has more resources than needed
and, thus, it will give them to higher types and to get higher
rewards for the same resources. In the second case, the amount
of resources increases by 30% of the original amount each time
we add a new CI. The CC utility in this case keeps increasing
as the CC allocates the more available resources to higher types
to get higher rewards.
Next, we add a new vulnerability level with associated lower
bound of 140 and we increase the number of available resources
to 650. We have 4 CIs, they are assumed to be within different
w types in ascending order, i.e. CI 1 is within w1 and so on.
However, the CC still knows their probabilities not their actual
types. Fig. 2 shows the utility of CIs in case of using optimal
contracts and in case of equal resource allocation. The figure
proves the monotonicity property of the proposed contract as
higher types CIs get higher utilities. We can also see in Fig. 2 that,
in case of optimal contracts, higher types CIs get higher utilities
and lower types CIs get lower utilities compared to equal resource
allocation. However, these lower utilities is not a problem as these
CIs get much more resources than needed for protection.
In Fig. 3, while maintaining the parameters of Fig. 2, we show
the utility of the infrastructure as the contract type varies. Here,
we measure the utility of each CI if it used the contract designed
for its type and contracts designed for other types. In Fig. 3, we
can clearly see that it is better for every CI to use the contract
designed for its type as this maximizes its utility. Actually, CIs
can get more resources from choosing higher types contracts
but will be required to pay higher rewards which is reflected
in decreasing their utility.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the problem of resource al-
location for protecting CIs. We have formulated the problem
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Fig. 3. The utility of each infrastructure while accepting the contract designed
for his type or other contracts.
using a contract-theoretic model in which a CC offers contracts
to a number of CIs and each one selects its best contract. For
each CI, we have defined two different types that correspond
to the vulnerability and the criticality levels. In the model, the
CC does not know these exact levels but only knows with
which probability a CI will belong to a certain level. We have
provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for such resource
allocation contracts under asymmetric information. The problem
was then relaxed and solved to show that it has an optimal
solution and motivates each CI to accept the contract designed
for each type. Simulation results have shown that this model
helps the CC to get higher utility than the case of equal resource
allocation. In addition, our results show that each CI will not
gain from selecting other contracts as its utility will not increase.
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